A Comprehensive Effort to Arrive at an Optimally Reliable Human Factors Taxonomy by King, Raymond E.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology - 2015 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology 
2015 
A Comprehensive Effort to Arrive at an Optimally Reliable Human 
Factors Taxonomy 
Raymond E. King 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2015 
 Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
King, R. E. (2015). A Comprehensive Effort to Arrive at an Optimally Reliable Human Factors Taxonomy. 
18th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 37-42. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2015/101 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at 
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2015 by an 
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
 
A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ARRIVE AT AN OPTIMALLY RELIABLE HUMAN  
FACTORS TAXONOMY 
 
Raymond E. King, Headquarters, Air Force Safety Center, Human Factors Division, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 
 
Department of Defense (DoD) members sought to improve the inter-rater reliability of the DoD 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, (DoDHFACS).  DoDHFACS differs from the 
original system developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), based on the work of Reason 
(1990), by further analyzing mishaps and hazards to a more granular level – arriving at specific 
“nanocodes.”  The steps involved in the effort included determining which of the 147 “nanocodes” 
were rarely/never used and collapsing nanocodes and rewriting definitions to arrive at 109 
nanocodes.  Next, a stepwise checklist to guide investigators through consideration of nanocodes 
was created.  Student investigators were guided to continually test checklists and generate results 
to gauge inter-rater reliability.  They were asked to offer constructive criticism to hone checklist 
questions.  While inter-rater reliability results are encouraging (Fleiss’ Kappa of .847 at the 
broadest level), additional work is necessary to realize the goal of an optimally reliable human 
factors taxonomy.  
 
As will be demonstrated, “Human factors” are causal or contributory in a majority of military aviation 
mishaps.  This paper reports on a Department of Defense (DoD) effort to improve the system used to categorize 
causal and contributing human factors.  Specifically, recent attempts to improve coding methods with the goal of 
achieving better inter-rater reliability and ultimately more actionable recommendations to improve safety will be 
described.  
Hartmann (1977), in a widely read and highly regard article, asserted that reliability is a necessary but not a 
sufficient basis for validity.  Hartmann went on to specify that there are two methods that can be employed to 
determine reliability:  percentage agreement reliability and reliability coefficient.  Hartmann advocated for the latter 
over the former as percentage agreement may produce inflated estimates of reliability.  Another issue to bear in 
mind when considering reliability is that categories must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive (that is, contain no 
overlapping elements and be complete) to achieve the highest reliability.  Overlapping elements may result in 
observers using different categories for the same observation and thus finding fewer distinctions between entities 
being compared.   
The roots of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), are described in “Taxonomy 
of Unsafe Operations” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997) and catalogued in a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
technical report (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) and a book “A Human Error Approach to Aviation Accident 
Analysis” (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Their system is built upon the “Swiss cheese” model of Reason (1990).  
Reason recommended that a mishap investigation start with the unsafe act(s), which represent(s) active failure.  The 
investigation does not stop there, however, as latent failures and conditions are examined next.  Latent conditions 
may exist undetected and unexpressed for years and include: preconditions, unsafe supervision, and organizational 
influences.     
According to Reason (1990), unsafe acts include both errors and violations.  Errors may be skill-based or 
may be due to decisional or perceptual factors.  Violations may be routine (such as cutting the same corners that 
many others cut) or exceptional.  Preconditions for unsafe acts include environmental (physical or technological) 
factors, conditions of operators (adverse mental states or adverse physiological states or physical/mental limitations) 
or personnel factors (crew resource management or personal readiness).  Reason (1990) argued that it is also 
essential to investigate at the supervisory and/or organizational level because such factors have direct impact on 
preconditions.  Addressing preconditions is likely to reveal opportunities to improve safety.  
Unsafe supervision includes:  inadequate supervision, supervisors planning inappropriate operations, a 
supervisor failing to correct a known problem, and supervisory violations.  Finally, there are organization influences, 
to include resource management, organizational climate, and organizational process.   One way to conceptualize 
these categories is to consider them “bins” containing the smaller units. 
Results of a query of the Air Force Automated System (AFSAS) database, which is accessed via a secure 
website, for fiscal years 2010 through 2013 (1 October 2009 through 30 September 2013) to assess overall human 
factors involvement in aviation mishaps is depicted in Table 1.  These numbers empirically demonstrate that human 
factors do, in fact, comprise a major concern for aviation safety.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  
Aviation Mishaps for FY 2010 – 2013  
 
Class Total Number  
Aviation 
Mishaps 
Aviation Mishaps with 
at  
Least 1 Human Factors 
Code 
Percentage of Aviation 
Mishaps with at Least 1 
Human Factors Code  
Total Number of Human 
Factors Codes 
A*      129    113   87.60% 1,452 
B*      218    113   51.83%    754 
C*   2,518    895   35.54% 2,586 
D*   3,142    737   23.46% 1,179 
E* 28,803 1,094      3.8% 3,185 
Grand 
Total 
34,810 2,952 59.59% 9.156 
*As defined in AFI 91-204, 12 February 2014.  
  
It should be noted that DoD HFACS has not been required to be used for Classes C, D, and E mishaps (hi-
lited).  The reader is thus cautioned not to be misled by the lower percentages and the deflating impact on the grand 
total.  The involvement of human factors is therefore likely heavily underestimated in USAF mishaps, particularly 
Class C, D, and E mishaps, as a result.   
Beaubien and Baker (2002) while generally favorable in their review of HFACS, note that HFACS is a bit 
coarse, as it does not delineate reasons for the conditions it identifies.  Beaubien and Baker also note that latent 
failures are difficult to identify in mishap analysis. The context of their review must be appreciated as they were 
examining coding schemes that were used with data already collected.  Their final point is important:  HFACS 
categories are nominal and not sequential and thus do not reveal a chain of events.  Therefore, they do not 
differentiate causes from effects.  That issue, however, is relatively easy to remedy in the overall scheme of an 
investigation.  For example, the USAF constructs a mishap sequence of contributory and causal findings, and 
embeds DoD HFACS within it.  O’Connor (2008) noted the above criticisms and detailed the efforts to address 
them, to include the formation of a Department of Defense (DoD) Working Group in 2003, which created DoD 
HFACS.  DoD HFACS introduced increased granularity, an additional level of classification:  “nanocodes.”  The 
original DoD HFACS included 147 nanocodes, organized under the categories (bins) delineated above (unsafe acts, 
preconditions, unsafe supervision, organization influences).  O’Connor (2008) examined the reliability of DoD 
HFACS, version 6.2.  He found that U.S. Navy and Marine aviators undergoing mishap investigator training were 
unable to achieve acceptable reliability, but noted that they had received only minimal training.  Although the raters 
were able to agree on the nanocodes not used, they were unable to achieve consistent agreement concerning which 
nanocodes applied (“there were only seven nanocodes in which 50% or greater of the participants agreed to select 
the nanocode,” p. 602).  O’Connor noted that raters were confused by the number (147) of available nanocodes and 
that the nanocodes contained overlapping concepts.    O’Connor found that collapsing codes improved inter-rater 
reliability.  O’Connor therefore argued for nanocodes that are exhaustive, parsimonious, and mutually exclusive.  
O’Connor also noted that his research participants may not have been reading and considering the nanocodes’ one-
paragraph definitions, relying instead on the names of the nanocodes.   
O’Connor called for subject matter experts to review the nanocodes to determine if some could be removed 
or combined with other nanocodes.  O’Connor even went as far as to suggest that the nanocode level be abandoned 
if acceptable reliability could not be achieved without extensive training.  A 2011 Aerospace Medical Association 
presentation, DoD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System X, prepared by human factors practitioners 
(Brian T. Musselman, Jeffrey D. Alton, Thomas G. Hughes, Patricia LeDuc, Richard J. Farley, & Antonio B. 
Carvalhais) from the three service safety centers had four expert raters code 54 USAF Class A mishaps with DoD 
HFACS version 6.2.  They found a Kappa coefficient of .5494 with 76 out of 147 (52%) nanocodes having 
reliability greater than or equal to .60.  The authors recommended: “Improve code definition,” and development of 
an “organized training curriculum.”  Subsequent studies used DoD HFACS X, which contained fewer nanocodes 
(102, rather than 147).  The average Kappa coefficient increased to an impressive 0.84 with expert coders, but 
novice coders continued to struggle, achieving Kappa coefficients of .2453 and .3239.  The authors urged the 
development of a decision-tree algorithm, redesign of DoD HFACS into larger buckets (even if granularity would be 
sacrificed), and limiting coding at the nanocode level to experts only.       
The steps in the current effort to improve DoD HFACS included determining the frequency that each of the 
nanocodes was used and considering retiring those nanocodes that were very infrequently used.  Nanocodes that 
 
 
 
were similar in the phenomena they described, as evidenced by having overlapping definitions, were merged and the 
definitions reworked.  The goal was to reduce the number of nanocodes and to improve the mutual exclusivity of the 
remaining nanocodes.  Specifically, AFSAS was further queried for fiscal years 2010 through 2013 for aviation and 
ground mishaps to determine the frequency of use of each of version 6.2’s 147 nanocodes. It should be noted that 
AFSAS was queried to arrive at two totals: the first count tallied a specific HFACS nanocode cited once per mishap.  
Otherwise, a given nanocode assigned against multiple members of a crew would inflate the total.  The other tally 
counted the grand total of HFACS nanocodes used, with no restriction on how many times a nanocode was used in 
any given mishap.  The US Army and Navy, as members of the DoD HFACS Working Group, performed similar 
tallies.  In the USAF, for example, PC 201 used only once for all classes of aviation and ground mishaps.   Finally 
the DoD HFACS Working Group ensured that nanocodes were aligned in the correct bins.  Nanocodes that were 
relocated to other bins were reassigned an alphanumeric to be consistent with the bin the new bin.   Ultimately, the 
147 nanocodes in version 6.2 were collapsed to109 nanocodes in version 7.0.  The Working Group then developed a 
checklist, colloquially known as “Turbo HFACS,” that uses a decision tree to guide investigators.    A response of 
“yes” guides the investigator to the correct “bin” and suggests a list of defined nanocodes.  This paper delineates the 
motivation to change DoD HFACS 6.2 and to document the changes made in DoD HFACS 7.0.  This paper also 
examines the inter-rater reliability of DoD HFACS.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred and forty students attending USAF aircraft mishap investigation courses served as 
participants.  Most of the participants were pilots and maintenance personnel attending the Aircraft Mishap 
Investigation Course (AMIC) at the Headquarters, Air Force Safety Center (HQ AFSEC), Kirtland AFB, NM.  
Additional data was collected from aerospace medical personnel (flight surgeons, aerospace physiologists, and 
clinical psychologists) who attended the Aircraft Mishap Investigation and Prevention (AMIP) course, held at the at 
the USAF School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.  
 
Procedures 
Participants were given approximately 45 minutes to read and code sanitized (basic identifying information 
had been removed) synopses of mishap reports that had been investigated by Safety Investigation Boards (SIBs).  
The synopses were approximately two typed, single-spaced, pages in length, using a 10-point font. To protect 
privilege, all mishap reports were immediately collected at the conclusion of the exercises.  These mishap synopses 
are not published here because the degree of additional sanitizing that would have been necessary to publish them in 
this report would have rendered them virtually incomprehensible.  The research design for this project was not 
strictly pre-planned, but rather evolved and capitalized on opportunities that presented themselves (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2.    
Summary of the Evolution of DoD HFACS version 7.0 Research Activities.   
 
First Trials Second Trials Third Trials 
Student investigator teams provided 
Checklist only. 
Student investigator teams given 
answer sheets along with Checklist 
and required to submit responses on 
it, 
Student investigator teams given 
answer sheets along with Checklist 
and required to submit responses on 
it. 
Student investigator teams were 
directed to use only DoD HFACS 
version 7.0 for exercise. 
Student investigator teams were 
directed to use DoD HFACS version 
6.2 and then introduced to version 
7.0 for exercise. 
 
Student investigator teams were 
taught to use DoD HFACS version 
6.2 and then introduced to version 
7.0 for exercise. 
18-question version of Checklist 
used. 
8-question (with sub questions) 
version of Checklist used. 
8-question (with sub questions) 
version of Checklist used. 
 Student investigator teams asked to 
list the three to five (and then the 
five) most important HFACS 
nanocodes. 
Student investigator teams asked to 
list the five most important HFACS 
nanocodes. 
  
 
 
 
 
First Trials. 
In the first data collections, 31 student investigator teams used an 18-question version of the DoD HFACS 
7.0 Checklist to code three aircraft mishap scenarios.  The author presented a brief introduction (approximately 10 
minutes) to the DoD HFACS 7.0 Checklist.  The participants were directed to use the questions of the Checklist and 
work together in teams of two or three members.  Following the advice of O’Connor and Walker (2011), 
participants were organized into small teams rather than working alone to better simulate the conditions of a safety 
investigation board.  Participants were instructed to not speak to any member of another team about the mishap 
during the exercise.     
 
Second Trials. 
The next series of data collection aimed to directly compare DoD HFACS 6.2 to DoD HFACS 7.0.  Student 
investigator teams were given a mishap scenario and directed to first use version 6.2 as outlined in AFI 91-204.  The 
student investigative teams conclusions were compared to the outcomes as determined by the actual Safety 
Investigation Board (SIB) and reviewed by the Memorandum of Final Evaluation (MOFE).  After the student rater 
teams’ responses using version 6.2 were collected, the teams were trained to use version 7.0 (using basically the 
same introduction described above) and directed to again code the scenario, without regard to what they coded using 
version 6.2.  To encourage student investigator teams to read nanocode definitions, they were required to record 
their answers on sheets that only contained the alphanumeric codes, so that they would not base their decisions 
merely on the names of the nanocodes, without reading and considering the full definition.  Moreover, rater groups 
were asked to list the three to five nanocodes that were the most important in the mishap, of course starting with 
those that they deemed causal.  Following the input from the epidemiologists identified in the Acknowledgements, 
the participants were ultimately directed to list the five most important DoD HFACS nanocodes.  The actual SIB and 
the MOFE found 12 DoD HFACS nanocodes to be applicable.   
 
Third Trials. 
Another data collection was held using a mishap that had been coded with fewer nanocodes by the SIB and 
which included only nanocodes that transitioned to version 7.0.  Because the purpose of AMIC is to train 
investigators and not serve as a research laboratory, this AMIC class received more detailed instruction on a strategy 
to use DoD HFACS 6.2.  The student investigators needed to be prepared to investigate mishaps immediately upon 
the completion of their training and there was no start date yet established for the operational transition to version 
7.0.  In applying version 6.2, student investigators were urged to read and consider definitions rather than just rely 
on the one-page wire diagram.  After these student investigator teams completed their coding with version 6.2, their 
answer sheets were collected.  These student investigator teams were then introduced to version 7.0, using basically 
the same instruction used in the first two trials.    
 
Qualitative Feedback. 
The feedback received from students led the authors and the rest of the Working Group to continually 
refine questions, eventually arriving at a solution of eight questions with sub-questions.  Students were subsequently 
asked to provide written feedback on their opinions of the changes made in HFACS 7.0.   
 
 
Results 
First Trials. 
During the first series of data collection, 18 of 31 (58%) rater teams selected the identical “yes” pattern 
when coding Scenario One using DoD HFACS version 7.0.  Four of the 31 (13%) rater teams selected an identical 
but alternate pattern.  Twenty-four (77%) rater teams selected the same nanocodes as the top three (out of 109) 
overall codes.  The Fleiss’ Kappa in considering the responses to the 18 questions was .847.  The Fleiss’ Kappa for 
the 109 nanocodes was .545 and the average Pairwise Cohen’s Kappa was .543. 
The 18-queston version of DoD HFACS, version7.0 did not fare as well with two other scenarios.  In 25 
rater teams coding Scenario Two, only four rater teams selected an identical “yes” pattern.  There were two other 
common patterns with each being selected by two rater teams. Twenty (80%) rater teams selected the same top three 
codes.  The Fleiss’ Kappa in considering the responses to the 18 questions was .498.  The Fleiss’ Kappa for the 109 
nanocodes was .415 and the average Pairwise Cohen’s Kappa was .400. 
Scenario Three had two of fifteen rater teams selecting an identical yes pattern.  Five codes were selected 
10 or more times by rater teams.  Fifteen rater teams selected the top three overall codes.  The Fleiss’ Kappa in 
 
 
 
considering the responses to the 18 questions was .550.  The Fleiss’ Kappa for the 109 nanocodes was .487 and the 
average Pairwise Cohen’s Kappa was .512. 
 
Second Trials. 
As seen in Table 3, during the exercise using Mishap #1, when the student rater teams used DoD HFACS 
6.2, nine out of 14 rater teams (64%) matched at least one of the above findings as being among their most important 
three to five DoD HFACS nanocodes.  One rater team of 14 (7%) matched three nanocodes; eight rater teams (57%) 
had one match, and five rater teams (36%) had no matches of their top three to five DoD HFACS nanocodes to those 
of the SIB.  Using DoD HFACS 7.0, two student rater teams (14%) had three matches; three student rater teams 
(21%) had two matches, nine student rater teams (64%) had one match, and zero student rater teams had no matches.  
Making this contrast even more stark (and more favorable to version 7.0) is the fact that two of the nanocodes 
identified in Mishap #1 using DoD HFAC version 6.2 did not transition to version 7.0 and thus were not available to 
the raters during the version 7.0 portion of the exercise.   
 
Table 3.  
Comparing DoD HFACS 6.2 to 7.0 Anchored Against Actual SIB Results, Mishap #1 
 
Number of Matches to Actual SIB DoD HFACS 6.2 DoD HFACS 7.0 
3 Matches 1 student rater team matched SIB 2 student rater teams matched SIB 
2 Matches  3 student rater teams matched SIB 
1 Match 8 student rater teams matched SIB 9 student Rater teams matched SIB 
0 Matches 5 student rater teams  
 
Third Trial. 
The results of the exercise using Mishap #2 are presented in Table 4.  Two rater teams elected to list only 
four codes as the “most significant” during the version 7.0 portion of the exercise and could not be persuaded to list 
more.  By doing so, they lessened the opportunity to maximize matching what the SIB found. 
 
Table 4.  
Comparing DoD HFACS 6.2 to 7.0, Anchored Against Actual SIB Results, Mishap #2 
 
Number of Matches to Actual SIB DoD HFACS 6.2 DoD HFACS 7.0 
4 Matches 3 student rater teams matched SIB 1 student rater team matched SIB 
3 Matches 7 student rater teams matched SIB 5 student rater teams matched SIB 
2 Matches 4 student rater teams matched SIB 5 student rater teams matched SIB 
1 Match  2 student rater teams matched SIB 
0 Matches 1 student rater team matched SIB  
 
Finally, student raters were asked to provide written feedback on their perception of the relative value of 
version 7.0 over version 6.2.  Initially, the comments were mostly neutral as they are criticisms of both versions.  
The comments became much more positive. (nine out of 14, with no negative comments).  Previously, comments 
from students were collected in a more informal fashion, but were still useful in the evolution of the checklist.  Some 
typical themes from the student investigators included that the new version is “less intimidating” and “less 
subjective” and gives investigations structure.  Suggestions for improvement included the observation that some of 
the questions are too broad and the sub questions need to be read and considered even if the instructions advise users 
to skip over the sub questions.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a series of comparison using a variety of mishap scenarios, the checklist for DoD HFACS version 7.0 
performed well.  These encouraging results can be explained as follows:  A taxonomy that has fewer nanocodes and 
nanocodes that have distinct meaning improves user satisfaction and may, itself, increase inter-rater reliability.  
While a systematic approach to considering the larger categories as well as the nanocodes likely is a key component 
to the improvement of inter-rater reliability, simply encouraging student investigators to consult the definitions of 
the nanocodes also likely improved inter-rater reliability.  Systematically guiding investigators to consider all 
 
 
 
nanocodes will increase the likelihood that the definitions of the nanocodes will be read and considered.  As pointed 
out by previous researchers as noted in this report, requiring coding at a finer degree of granularity requires training 
and providing investigators with the proper resources, such as a checklist. 
As noted by the participants, another issue is the correct structure of the checklist questions.  Too many 
questions are likely to try the patience of investigators, while fewer questions with sub-questions run the risk of 
investigators missing significant areas that could benefit from further inquiry.  The feedback gleaned from the 
students who graciously participated in this research suggest that investigators would be wise to not skim over sub-
questions after answering “no” to the major question.  While the DoD HFACS Working Group should consider 
honing the questions and sub-questions, DoD HFACS 7.0 is a step in the right direction according to student 
feedback and the results obtained in this study.  A future revision should revise the questions and elevate some of the 
sub questions to free standing questions.  Above all, any strategy that gets investigators to read and consider the 
definitions of the nanocodes will result in a better investigative outcome.  The “yes/no” format of the questions in 
version 7.0 results in a clear binning (getting in the ballpark of applicable nanocodes).  Such binning of causes and 
contributing factors represents an advancement in investigations with actionable results as it allows leaders to more 
accurately allocate resources to reduce future mishaps.  Even if there is some disagreement as to which exact 
nanocode within a bin is the cause, at least the correct bin is identified and proper attention is paid to mitigation of a 
major cause or contributing factor of mishaps. 
Future efforts should include a continued refinement of the questions, as noted above, as well as the 
creation of a small set of questions to assist Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reporters submit reports that 
more clearly highlight human factors issues.  ASAP reports are considered “safety without the mishap,” and thus 
could better use of DoD HFACS actually help improve safety.  Above all, investigators in training in all services 
must be given ample opportunity to practice investigating and coding mishaps during the “organized training 
curriculum” advocated by Musselman, et al. 
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